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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS-DENIAL UNDER COLOR OF
STATE LAW OF RIGHT TO SERVE ON FEDERAL JURY-Plaintiff, a probationary

high school teacher, was dismissed by the Board of Education of New York
City upon the complaint of Keyes, the principal of her school, that she was
absent from her duties for almost a month while serving on a federal jury.

RECENT DECISIONS

The state commissioner of, education and the state court 1 denied her appeal
for reinstatement, on the ground that her status under New York law was
merely probationary.2 Plaintiff sued defendant Keyes in the federal district
court, to recover damages under the Civil Rights Act 8 for the deprivation of
a right secured to her by the law of the United States." The district court
dismissed the complaint. Held, reversed. Plaintiff has stated a cause of action
under the Civil Rights Act. The cause was remanded for determination of
the question whether or not plaintiff's exercise of her federal privilege was unreasonable in the light of her duties as a teacher. Bomar v. K(J)•es, (C.C.A. 2d,
1947) 162F. (2d) 136,certioraridenied, (U.S.1947) 68S.Ct. 166.
The source of the right which plaintiff asserts here bears examination, for
the idea that service on a federal jury is a federal right has received little consideration.5 That the federal law providing qualifications for jurors is in itself
creative of the right seems doubtful. More plausibly, the right is akin to the
right to vote in federal elections and the other privileges and immunities of
national citizenship, which are protected not only by the Fourteenth Amendment, but also by the inherent power of the federal government. 6 Since the
right is one which the sovereign has inherent power to protect, it would be
possible for Congress to pass legislation applicable to individuals, whether they
Matter of Bomar v. Cole, 177 Misc. 740, p N.Y.S. (2d) 825 (1941).
16 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1945) ~ 872 (1).
3
8 U.S.C. ( 1940) § 43; "Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law•.••"
4
28 U.S.C. (1940) § 4n provides that "jurors to serve in the courts of the
United States, in each State respectively, shall have the same qualifications ••• and
be entitled to the same exemptions, as jurors in the highest court of law in such
State may have and be entitled to .•••" The New York statute provides that women
are exempt from jury duty if they claim this exemption. 29 N.Y. Consol. Laws
(McKinney, 1945) § 720.
5
This is not to be confused with the right of an accused to have a jury selected
in a manner which is not discriminatory; the latter is secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment and enforced by federal statute. 8 U.S.C. (1940) § 44; Strander v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
6
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1872); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031 (1941). The indefiniteness as to what rights
are privileges and immunities of national citizenship is shown in the concurring
opinions in Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939). Although the
decision is of doubtful authority today on the principle for which it stands, the
language of Justice Miller in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 35 (1867),
when he speaks of the right of the federal government to call on its citizens to participate in its affairs, would seem applicable. Does not this confer on a citizen a
correlative right not to be hindered or penalized for performing his duty? That
penalizing one for the exercise of a right is as much within the prohibition of the
statute as is deprivation of the right, is well supported by the language of the principal
case, and by the decision in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S. Ct.
877 (1943). However, some doubt may be cast on classification of jury service among
these rights, especially in view of the New York statute, which exempts women from
jury duty on their request.
1

2
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act under color of state law or not. But defendant's liability here is solely
under the Civil Rights Act, and it is therefore necessary that he be shown to
have acted under color of statute. Judge Learned Hand first dismissed this
with the statement that there is no need to discuss this question, since the Board
of Education acted under the New York statute providing for the discharge
of probationary teachers. It may be granted that plaintiff's dismissal was under
color of statute, but the action against defendant Keyes is predicated on his
having procured that dismissal. Therefore, ,the basis for finding that Keyes
acted under color of law could not be this New York statute, but rather that
he was placed in a position to procure plaintiff's dismissal by some statute conferring on him administrative powers. Although this can be asserted in the
case of a sheriff or police officer, even though he violates a state law in the
process of his administration or enforce)ment, 7 it is hardly ·a tenable position in
the case of a high school principal, whose office is to supervise one of the state's
educational units. Can it be said that the statutory aspect of Keyes' act was
supplied by his aid to the Board of Education in dismissing the plaintiff? Judge
Hand uses language which may indicate that this is the case, when he says
that Keyes' complaint caused plaintiff's dismissal, and that he and the Board
of Education combined to cause plaintiff financial loss because she exercised
a f~deral right. In this event, it is unnecessary to inquire whether Keyes' act
in itself was under color of statute; his liability under the Civil Rights Act would
turn on his complicity as a joint tori:feasor with the Board of Education, which
did act unde·r color of statute. 8 But, accepting this proposition, would not any
private individual be similarly liable under a statute such as the one in question,
when he aids a state officer or agency in the deprivation of a federal right
secured against state action? This is certainly a departure from the cases, which
have in only very limited situations found private persons susceptible to prosecution, civil or criminal, under a statute requiring action under color of law.9
The decision may pose a perplexing problem to persons such. as Keyes who
- are charged solely with the administration of an efficient educational unit.

William J. Schrenk, Jr.
7

Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 33 S. Ct. 312 (1913);
United States v. Sutherland, (D.C. Ga. 1940) 37 F. Supp. 344; United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S. Ct. 1031 (1941); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 65 S. Ct. 1031 (1945). But in the Screws case, three members of the court
dissented, on the ground that action under color of law was limited to acts by a state
officer pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. Rotnem, "Clarification of the Civil Rights'
Statutes," 2 BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 252 (1942).
8
Picking v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 240, in
which the court stated that the civil rights statute in question [8 U.S.C. (1940) § 43]
gives a right of action in tort to everyone whose rights are trespassed by one who acts
under color of state law. Vicarious liability under section 20 of the criminal code
[ 18 U.S.C. ( 1940) § 52] has been extended to private persons who assist state officers
in the denial of federal rights secured against state action. Culp v. United States,
(C.C.A. 8th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 93.
9
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883); For a discussion of the
possible expansion of the concept of "color of statute," see Fraenkel, "The Federal Civil
Rights Law," 31 MINN. L. REv. 301 (1947). Also, Ex parte Riggins, (D.C. Ala.
1904), 134 F. 404; March v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 7$7 (1944).

